The Vale of my Youth

A poem for you all (anyone who lives in suburbia can relate):

Vale of migrant youth-
a copious valley draught and sate
while black laces of yellow striped grud
splay over an indian burial ground-
vital lines for quell spaces
where no bodies thrive

Seat of bodiced woe-
the colour of pigs unfed-
A wide yawning chump sky
looming over the valley of the dead

Rank malt gloom seer fascion
High, mute invitations to cope
Dare we speak the words bravely
of our honest fears and hopes?

Singly a deep love is birthed
from the chapel-white samesonry--
Here I write in cheerless mirth,
such phrases known only to Agony.

How do I keep my long attention span?

Coffee? Soda? Some kind of energy drink?

No, my friends. Jackie (I know you all love how I refer to myself in the third person) drinks simply aqua pure, puro agua, simply water to keep my mind fresh. After taking a nutrition class, I realize how important water is for all the bodily functions, from blood flow to brain flow - 'tis the only true way to do genuine philosophy.

What of creative writing? Well yes, that's quite another thing altogether...

A Kantian Interlude

I ask: What is given to us in the Kant's preface to the Critique of Pure Reason? It is a gift that we must tread carefully with, because to apprehend its fullness, taking its strict care and vivid hopes as personal principals, we may evidence symptoms of an unseemly lack of convention.

To move inward, to move critically inward, is the most begrudging and dangerous movement a woman (or man) can make. For all the personal rewards it offers, not only will this movement end up as a thankless effort for which one will gain many enemies, but it will be a task through which the glib and effortless speech of the many will grow more and more grotesque as our fatiguing project pushes onwards, personal conviction after personal conviction being dragged out from each of their hiding-hovels and put to judgement. We may think of it as the beginning of modernity because it forfeits all glory, and puts humanity in an aesthetic relation to itself - that is, we endeavour on a task for our own sake and only so that it reaches the heights of a self-potential.

While I have been simultaneously reading Deleuze's critique of the Critique in his Difference and Repetition, Kant's shortcomings in doing away with an unreal "image of thought" does little to disturb the great respect I feel for this sincerest of endeavours. This respect, as I have just described it, would easily seem to apply to a great number of people in which self-reflection appears to be an upstanding virtue. Painted in such colours - as a pioneer of only the most rigorously discovered truth - Kant would have no opposition, but then my earlier statements about the danger of his task are unfounded.

Unfortunately, we live in an age where not only is the whole text, the whole unread text, taken for granted, but even the admirable intentions stated in Kant's small 40 page preface (both 1st and 2nd editions) go widely unaccounted for and ignored. The internet in general (sites such as wikipedia in specific) and a culture well acclimated to mass communication has generated people who seem thoroughly unafraid of hearsay. Direct quotations often fare no better because they are easily fitted to the context of someone's personal intentions rather than with the author's. Though I don't think there is anything wrong with quoting for a meaning that the original author may have never thought of because of his historical era, we must refrain from haphazardly drawing a phrase out of a context which we have no understanding nor familiarity with, even to the degree that we would quote the author as being in favour of something she or he would likely fervently reject (or vice versa).

Suddenly we find ourselves with supposed scholars all schools of thought who have read nothing but scattered summaries and references. A phenomenon may even occur where some interpretation of a historical figure is strengthened and reinforced in the popular mind while, simultaneously, the interpretation of a smaller group of those who read and truly think about the figure grows in another direction.

The gap of knowledge between the educated and the uneducated has been obscene in its wideness throughout history - the graver issue in the modern era is that the ignorant now believe themselves possessed of the same degree and calibre of knowledge as the educated. (I hope it is known that I do not refer merely to schooling, in which a great number of the aforementioned ignorant participate just the same, but of genuine thoughtfulness) "Descartes' famous suggestion that good sense (the capacity for thought) is of all things in the world the mot equally distributed rests upon no more than an old saying, since it amounts to reminding us that men are prepared to complain of lack of memory, imagination or even hearing, but they always find themselves well served with regard to intelligence or thought."

On Meaning and Discovery

We do not take a philosopher seriously enough if we are satisfied with the mere feel of his philosophy: if his propositions, taken at their face value, are false or contradict each other, if he relies on equivocations and his arguments are invalid, all that is worth pointing out, though insufficient. The question remains whether his propositions are meant to be taken at their face value.

Some readers fasten on a single exoteric interpretation; others, more sophisticated, make a catalogue of possible exoteric meanings; still others seek an esoteric meaning reserved for initiates - and all three types of readers ignore the context.

Few philosophers place confidence in any of their own propositions. The poor student and the eclectic fasten on the proposition to champion it; the positivist/analytic (Michael), to refute it. The reader for whom one writes goes beyond the proposition to see what is meant.

Propositions can be multivocal without being equivocal: to the perceptive they speak with many voices, signify many things, and mean a great deal.

First, a proposition functions not only in an immediate context on the page where it occurs, but also in a larger systematic context, in the author's over-all attempt at the time of writing. Secondly, there is the chronological context - the place of the proposition in the author's development. This is especially important if the statement does not formulate his considered opinion but only a passing fancy or a provisional stage of his thought. We must ask what the author meant by the terms he used, and whether he used these terms in the same sense in his early and his late works, or even throughout the work at hand.

All this will seem a matter of course only to those who have never read much theology or philosophic criticism.

Besides the systematic and developmental meaning there are the many symptomatic meanings. The proposition may be symptomatic psychologically: the author's choice, and especially his abuse, of words, his imagery and his examples, his style and attitude, may invite psychological study. A proposition may also be symptomatic historically and reveal something about an era.

After we have asked about these three kinds of meaning - systematic, developmental, and symptomatic - yet another question remains which in some cases may be most important of all: What did the author see? The answers to such questions as, for example, what concrete instances he had in mind and against what view he aimed his proposition, do not necessarily solve this central problem, though they are relevant and important. Nor is the difference between what an author saw and said necessarily reducible to the difference between what he meant and what his proposition means. What he meant to say may well have been as wrong as his proposition, and nevertheless he may have seen something important.

At this level we must go behind not only what he said, but even what he meant, to recapture his vision. We use untenable propositions as clues in our search for truth. Even as it is the fascination of a detective story that the truth is finally discovered on the basis of a great many accounts of which not one is free of grievous untruths - even as it is sometimes given to the historian to reconstruct the actual sequence of events out of a great many reports which are shot through with lies and errors - those who study philosophers in the way here suggested use a lot of unauthentic pictures to draw a true map.

A philosopher may claim, for example, that A influenced B, and this may be disproved; but perhaps he noted a similarity which leads to the discovery of a common source or to a better understanding of A and B. Some of Nietzsche's and Freud's suggestions are open to conclusive objections; yet both men called attention to things which are much more important than their errors. To cite Nietzsche: "The errors of great men . . . are more fruitful than the truths of little men."

Hegel's statement that truth can be offered only in a system is a case in point. He overstated the case for the system, but recognized the inadequacy of any proposition and saw the need for an interlocking web of propositions; he understood the principle of cross-illumination and the essential circularity of truth; he knew that, as T.S. Eliot has put it since, "in my beginning is my end" and "every phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning".

Justification by Empiricism Alone, or: The Skeptic's Manifesto, Part I

(STILL the most important entry I have written....)

The skeptic's position has priority over the theistic position.

(Notice that careful wording...)

Why?

That is what I will here attempt to answer.

("What do you mean by 'priority', Jackie?") (Quiet, you!)

***

I would be most gracious if you, whomever you may be, will allow me to partie the human mind into two modes of life: understanding and belief.

It is, in fact, a false dichotomy, but unlike so many others who take their dichotomies rather seriously, I admit that it is false and employ it only to illustrate a philosophical point. (Perhaps this seriousness shown by others comes about because they are under the impression that they do philosophy to discover truth?)

Beliefs:

1) Our beliefs are only foundational in the very strict sense of that word: they ground our unconscious mode of apprehension. What we believe about the world allows us to function in it based on those beliefs - believing that the earth we walk on is solid and that gravity will cause things to fall from our hands when we let them go. These sorts of things are discovered through our empirical experience of the world.

1.2) Science is the method of describing the reasons for these empirical experiences. So far as we have solidity, we know it is not only Newtonian force pushing back upon us with equal force as that with which we are pushing upon it, but also something molecular that makes an object cohere. We then move into chemistry to describe why things can be manipulated and why not every object is of the same substance and therefore of the same pliancy.

1.2.2) Thales, the first "natural scientist" (I deliberately say that he was not the first philosopher because I think either Heraclitus or Socrates was truly the first philosopher) wanted to describe water as the essential substance of all things, changing its "form" according to the object. We now know that the different elements and they way they bond at the molecular level is the reason why different objects have different consistencies.

1.3) However intricate and abstract science may become, its only true function is to give reasons for the variations we discover in our empirical experiences and to make sure these reasons agree with reasons found in other branches of science. (A law of biology should not violate a law of physics).

2.1) Science is hardly useful to live a flourishing life (science in its goals does not make anyone become a better person). Any benefit to humankind is merely accidental, and generally life-sustaining, rather than life-promoting.

3.1) We trust science with giving reasons for what is foundational to our everyday functioning, but it is our empirical experience that truly causes us to believe these things.

Understanding:

1.1) Understanding is an active function of the mind, but it is not consciously active. The active aspect was once called "will" in ancient times, but this is an error of causation. The active element is caused by the unconscious understanding, so actions (kissing a loved one, repenting for "sin", promoting awareness about homelessness) generally reflect some unconscious state of an individual. This is much more apparent in animalia than in humania (simply because our actions are more complex does not mean they require a more complex conceptual entity).

1.1.2) The understanding serves as a model for the self, because actions pertaining to it generally follow a pattern. This pattern is an evidently stronger predictor than any single instance of an isolated decision being made as to the actions of an individual when presented with a new situation. Thus the understanding should be given priority over the "will" as a moral indicator (or indicator of activity).

1.1.3) Even if the name "will" is given to this semi-permanent self, it is an inefficient word because it is the relational aspect of living that most effects decisions (not affects, or else we'd be giving the decision priority, right?). The self does not have priority in this reasoning. This is an almost fatalistic idea, or at least posits only a very weak "self/will".

1.2) While understanding, like belief, is an unconscious phenomenon, it is much more easily subject to change. The physical environment which affects our belief generally remains static, while that which affects our understanding does not.

1.3) Our understanding appears progressive, but it is impossible to tell for sure. The seeming reality of "bad days" implies that our understanding has modality such as we see in a finances chart, rather than always moving up and forward, like a positive linear equation.

1.3.2) I am rather unsure of what I mean by "moving up and forward", but it is obviously qualitative and dangerously vague. Pain, at least, must be interpreted as a benign force for this to even be feasible.

2.1) Understanding is relational and conceptual. Facts do not affect it as they affect beliefs. Physical empirical experience only affects beliefs. Additionally, as I've already said, only physical empirical experience affects beliefs, not facts or science.

Aside: You may ask here about some scientific idea such as the world being round that is plainly a belief held by some people who have not studied the evidence, and have no means to grasp why the world is round when it appears to be flat beneath their feet. We do not blame someone for accepting these ideas, but they are only effective within discourse - they do not change our unconscious, interactive function that I have called belief. Only when the issue about the world is brought up in dialogue (with someone who does not believe that it is round) does it become important to give reasoning and evidence as to why it is round. But belief is not conscious, in a sense, what I have called belief is an assent unspoken in the mind. In this sense, belief can directly contradict science because this unspoken belief says that "the earth is flat, you can walk upon it, walk outside and have no fear". No one walks upon the ground with their unconscious mind under the impression always that it is round.

Here is my really key point in all this: Scientific discourse is beneficial and necessary when it is accounting for unknowns or things that are not explained generally by empirical experience.

One last point...

3.1) Understanding is involved in all matters of variance. It is everything that makes a being aware of other beings. The whole of Heidegger's Being and Time is dedicated to describing the understanding. To survive is a mode of which belief plays a part: that I shall eat. To question whether one should survive is a question of understanding.

***

Now, what is the purpose of this idea? If you have followed closely, you will see that understanding cannot be affected by anything but a very complex mode of obtaining experiences. This understanding has nothing to do with logic, science, or mathematics because the contextual self - that person who we are day to day, with a specific history and disposition - is almost fatalistic in the manner in which it approaches life. This has been well tested - even someone who assents to Kant's categorical imperative wholeheartedly will not be able to carry out this rule in her life unless she was already well disposed to do it.

There has always been a fine line between philosophy and literature. It is difficult to comprehend to what extent and in what manner reading a dialogue of Plato's or reading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason will affect our understanding. But in the contemporary era a more serious problem has arisen. How do we distinguish between philosophy and science, rather than between philosophy and literature?

If we take the first "category" of the mind that I have tried to establish and examine its counterpart in the world, we find something very interesting. That which gives scientific reasons for beliefs actually has nothing to do with whether we hold those beliefs or not - science is powerless, in this sense.

Is it the same with the understanding? I don't even know! What I am writing is, I believe, philosophy. I cannot imagine myself reading such a piece and being unaffected by it, but does it affect my interaction with life and the decisions I make? Perhaps it is a discourse only. At the very least, however, it offers reasons for why I believe what I do, reasons that run deeper than scientific reasons, which really are not reasons but explanations.

Does philosophy, then, provide reasons for understanding rather than merely explaining them conceptually? What about literature and art in general? How does it affect us? Is there a missing category of the mind that I have not been able to represent through the ideas "belief" and "understanding"? This issue is surprisingly complex, and I don't intend to contend with all aspects here...

What I see out of all this is:

Theology is not philosophy, and not only that, it is not a legitmate science. It is not legitimate at all except to satisfy personal needs.

Religion is literature, or more accurately, science fiction.

Theology is the attempt to provide scientific explanations for a book of science fiction called 'the bible'.

The only issue is that religious texts are generally not scientific, but rather mystic.

Theology appears to be the legitimate study of concepts, but it really deals with no concepts. It deals with mystic, unsubstantiated ideas that can only be discussed after they have been accepted a posteriori.

What is the philosopher's job? To trace the origin of these mystic ideas that are being treated scientifically.

Skepticism both a scientific and a philosophic stance.

Theology is the science of invented ideas, it is not philosophic.

Therefore, skepticism is undoubtedly the more legitimate stance. What is implied by skepticism? The belief in things which we experience empirically, but really, a belief that we cannot help but have.

I am happy with where I am going, because I realize it is a truly philosophic stance because it has no ready answer and can hardly be contained by this blog. I don't understand "rapid-fire" philosophy.

In any case, I will probably throughout the next week continue to revise and add to this idea that I see is insufficient for the point I am trying to establish, but my main concern is with clarity and consistency. If I have said anything that is unclear or does not make sense, please let me know so that I can continue to work with these ideas and establish what I hope to be a very important distinction between what is called science, philosophy, and theology.

Reply to MG comment on "Playing Mother"

What I wont to say:

The problem I hinted at in "Playing Mother" described the unseemlyness of a heaven that does not any longer allow for the particularities that are everywhere apparent here on earth, that is, those things that seem to satisfy us, and those which do not seem to satisfy us but which we do anyway and unto our dying day. Heaven is presupposed on the idea that not only can ALL humans enjoy their life so long as they are in the same place (heaven), but also that they will all enjoy it in the same way. This seems unfair to the amount of variation between individuals that we see on earth.

My question to you is this: What reason do we have to believe that there is a heaven if there are no characteristics shared by all humans (universals) that we cannot trace back to animal traits such as self-preservation or sexual love?

Most of my arguments are based on the idea that we should believe the more likely candidate for an explanation rather than the alternative. I see two alternatives as regards heaven:

A) Heaven is a real place that is able to satisfy one or more universal traits that all humans share as a result of their sharing the same spiritual essence.

or

B) Heaven was a place invented in ancient times because sorrow accompanied death in a way that no animal had ever experienced before and an afterlife was one method of alleviating this existential distress.

I have only had one person I was familiar with die in my life - a teacher of mine. I think heaven is a much more dreadful concept than it was in the past. She was young, extremely beautiful and intelligent, just recently married after a divorce, with two young children. I state this also as an argument against having a "soul" because after this experience I firmly believe that:

That which constituted my teacher as an individual must have gone through a fundamental change in heaven in order for her to prefer that life over her earthly life.

The only argument against this is that, with supreme knowledge she would see things would turn out better in the end or something: but that is speculation I am not willing to take part in. Again, I postulate two views and I choose the more likely:

A) A heaven exists and it is such a place that changes what we normally identify with as a "self" to such an extent that it is always better to be there than on earth.

or

B) What constitutes us as a "self" is only true each moment of our lives.

Just to be sure: I choose B in both cases.

Playing Mother

"Who were Shem and Shaun the living sons or daughters of? Night now! Tell me, tell me, tell me, elm! Night night! Telmetale of stem or stone. Beside the rivering waters of, hitherandthithering waters of... Night!"

Sit down at my feet, young peddler, and let me speak to you of the most mysterious myth, an invention like Blake's Tyger, of such terrible beauty, of such hideous origins. Origins, indeed, that will have you shallerying around the vales of your youth and piecing together in memory that insingular moment of loss. We were all childers once. Mum to my past: here I play a mummy for you mummers and murmerers, mollifying my mawkish memory. Read it all above - I've aged just twenty years, but my soul speaks eternally. Peg into that smile of mine you see: What does it say? Is it "joy, landlocked, in a body that doesn't keep"?

There's the riff, you and I aren't dissimilars. For my joy also wants eternity, wants deep, deep eternity. I want fictions, but not such gods and demons as have been propogated through the centuries. No, no – listen: we shall not have any unnecessary fictions.

Care to join, young 'ouns?

Procureth thine razors from thine pocket that hath inscriben upon its surface "Property of Sir Occam" and taketh these razors to all inflatious affronts, to all extrapropigal muddities, to that which would stinge and ewify the world which seemeth in-deed composed of such untainted beauty that it needeth not embarass (the verb in spanish: embarazar - to make pregnant) itself with the empty spaces given names by ancients. Those ancients who thought what hurt should be called morality, that what was unpredictable should be called God, and that death was really only the beginning of a new life.

Fin, again! Found a counfounding variable, didn't I? Turn'd it 'round! Tell me peddle-man, tell me, tell me, tell me, realm! Will we compose short stories in the presence of Godge? Will we be able to play our rock music and repair computers for the angels? Or is it simply that this eternity is simply an escape from your worldly life? Agitashition!

Now:

If any of you can establish one non-instinctual universal for me - I'll accept heavean (heaven). No qualms about it, just give me that (one).